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Abstract
Nuclear safeguards inspectors view historical trends on a regular basis to reassure themselves 
that a plant is operating as declared. Other types of inspector are likely to perform similar 
activities. Nuclear safeguards are founded on materials accountancy, and hence nuclear 
safeguards inspectors often want to relate what they see to laws of mass conservation. The 
interfaces discussed in this paper facilitate a synergy between qualitative reasoning regarding
trends with quantitative reasoning about simple models that are driven by forcing functions, 
which describe materials flows through a plant. The focus in the paper is on the assessment of 
data trends that pertain to a standard 3-tank arrangement in a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, 
and on how inspectors might wish to interact with evaluations performed.
1. Introduction
Chemical process plants are often inspected by various bodies including health and safety 
directorates. An additional inspection regime is imposed on nuclear process plants, because 
of the need to safeguard their nuclear material under international agreements. Inspectors of 
all kinds visit plants to gather and digest evidence. In sifting through this evidence they need 
to decide if certain aspects require further investigation. They are constrained by both time 
and knowledge limitations. They only visit at certain times and do not have the same depth of 
understanding about the state of the plant as the operators do. Although an operator might be 
prepared to divulge all, the inspector is unlikely to have the resources to assimilate all. 
Inspector overall objectives differ from those of the operators. The International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) publishes its current perspective of the role of nuclear safeguards 
inspectors regularly. Importantly Nackaerts (2011) emphasises that their goal is to ask the 
simple question: “Is this a safeguards related issue or isn’t it?” Health and safety directorates 
will ask a similar question related to health and safety. A considerable amount of effort might 
be required before this question can be answered with a reasonable level of confidence. 
The interfaces discussed in this paper focus on assessing data trends in nuclear fuel 
reprocessing plants. Nuclear safeguards inspectors view such trends on a regular basis to 
reassure themselves that a plant is operating as declared. Other types of inspector might 
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perform similar tasks, because graphical trends are produced in many applications including 
industrial, medical and other areas. This paper focuses on a domain whose processes can be 
modelled on the basis of laws of conservation. The aim is to reason about how laws relate to 
trends. Such reasoning might also have relevance during incidents such as that at Three-Mile-
Island (Walker, 2004) and at Fukushima (Miller et al, 2011).
Quantitative nuclear materials safeguards are founded on accountancy: laws of mass 
conservation applied to special nuclear material (SNM), such as plutonium or uranium, form 
the basis of regular material balance evaluation. Statistical approaches for mass balance 
evaluation require an estimate of standard deviation, commonly denoted MB, because of 
measurement errors. It is difficult to satisfy the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
accountancy-based diversion detection goal for large throughput facilities, because nuclear 
material accountancy measurement uncertainty increases as facility throughput increases, 
despite sustained efforts to reduce measurement uncertainty, Detailed knowledge is also 
required of the material located throughout the plant. Safeguards inspectors often augment 
this objective approach with so-called additional assurances. Of relevance here is the need to 
be assured that the plant is operated as declared.
Any safeguards related issue will involve the undeclared and inappropriate transport of 
special nuclear material. Such an activity must always result in an unexpected reduction in 
SNM mass somewhere in the plant that might be visible above alarms that are based on MB.
So such actions might be apparent to the inspector. However, not all the material will be 
under close observation all of the time and MB can be very large in large facilities, 
particularly if it is cost prohibitive to close the mass balance very frequently. Every day there 
might be numerous movements of material through pipes and process units, whose 
inventories are not that transparent. In addition instrument performance might not provide the 
fidelity to detect small movements. Any computer tools that might support the nuclear 
safeguards inspector in detecting and isolating these activities will have to relate to actual 
quantities, because it is the actual quantities that matter. 
Currently a number of different computer tools are used to monitor the flow of liquids 
(solutions) in various large-scale nuclear reprocessing plants (Burr et al, 2008). In the 1990s, 
Euratom installed a system at La Hague (Dekens et al, 1995), which has become the basis for 
several later systems, including that used to evaluate data collected at the Rokkasho 
Reprocessing Plant (RRP) in Japan. Here data is evaluated from 300 sensors on 92 vessels or 
other process equipment (Ehinger et al, 2004). System outcomes in all these systems are 
limited simply to the output of red-amber-green kinds of signals: they detect non-compliance 
with signatures; the inspector is then left to reason about the cause manually, with the help of 
graphed trends. A portable version of the package also exists (Janssens-Maenhout & L. 
Dechamp, 2004). These computer tools are commonly referred to as solution monitoring 
evaluation systems.
Certain plants, however, do not operate in such a prescribed way, to enable the generation of 
signatures.  ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ??????? ??? ??? ??????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ??? ??????????????? ?????? ????? ????????
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???????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ???? ??????????? ???????????? ?? ?? ????? ????????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ???
?????? ???????? ?????? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??? ??????? ??? ?? ???????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ???? ????????? ?????? ???? ????? ?????????? ?? ?????? ????????? The IAEA has 
developed a Tank Monitoring Evaluation System (TaMES) family of computer tools (Sirajov 
& Wang, 2008; Howell et al, 2009) to help inspectors reason about flows through certain 
parts of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. Tanks are by far the most common type of plant 
component in a reprocessing plant and hold most of the nuclear material. Usually 
instrumentation is available in every tank, so its bulk contents can be estimated and various 
trends can be evaluated. Reasoning about the transport of material around a plant must be 
relevant to many plants, nuclear or otherwise.
The TaMES family is founded on a simple representation known as the sub-event (Scothern 
& Howell, 1997; Howell & Scothern, 2000), which can be viewed as any extended episode in
a trend. Rules are applied to these sub-events to relate them to descriptions of known and 
acceptable activities (known as events). A typical activity might relate to tank sampling 
where the operator homogenises tank contents before withdrawing a small quantity. Such an 
activity should generate signatures in trends that can be represented as sequences of sub-
events. Any safeguards related issue over a relatively short time frame should generate one or 
more sub-events in mass trends that cannot be associated with these acceptable activities. 
With any such unresolved event, a TaMES would first identify and then eliminate acceptable 
activities to reveal these un-resolved sub-events. Unfortunately measurement anomalies
(beyond typical measurement errors) and operational misunderstandings can lead to the 
creation of other un-resolved sub-events. There is then a need to reason about the various
unexplained sub-events. Current operational versions of TaMES simply list unresolved sub-
events, leaving it up to the inspector to think about what might have caused the patterns 
observable in the trends. In these situations, an inspector would be guided by the knowledge 
that all the material that has entered a particular part of a plant should still be located 
somewhere, unless it has left the plant already. However an inspector is unlikely to have 
either the time or inclination to trace the transport of material through the plant. The 
computer tool presented here performs this function explicitly. Based on measurement data, 
these calculations are unlikely to be perfect, especially if certain data are anomalous. 
Anomalous data are handled explicitly relieving the inspector of potential distractions. A key 
aim of the research is to explore how these automatic evaluations should be presented, and 
how an inspector might wish to query the system about its conclusions. A key assumption is 
that measurement anomalies beyond usual measurement errors occur in relative isolation, 
meaning that common-mode instrument malfunctions over neighbouring tanks are extremely 
unlikely. A set of model forcing functions can be derived on this basis, which can estimate 
mass flows correctly even when an instrument is faulty. The sub-event can then be marked as 
non-safeguards related. The authors believe that if there is a common-mode instrument fault
in neighbouring tanks, then continued operation would be in question and the event would
remain unresolved.
In the context of process supervision, Gentil & Montemain (2004) argue that there is a natural 
predisposition to qualitative reasoning, especially when “qualitative reasoning reflects a
human’s aversion to calculations.” Gentil, Montmain & Combastel (2004) have proposed a 
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combined fault detection and isolation/artificial intelligence (FDI/AI) approach, in which 
qualitative reasoning is applied to patterns of residuals that are generated quantitatively from 
local numerical sub-models. Safeguards inspectors, however, need to relate back to the 
original quantitative data as much as possible. TaMES has some similarity to the work of 
Charbonnier et al (2005) who extract semi-qualitative temporal episodes on-line, from any 
univariate time series. Three primitives are used to describe the episodes: {Increasing, 
Decreasing, Steady}. Their method uses a segmentation algorithm, a classification of the 
segments into seven temporal shapes and a temporal aggregation of episodes. Other examples 
of the application of segmentation algorithms can be found in Miller & Howell (1999) and
Janssens-Maenhout & Dechamp, (2004); the context for the latter can be found in Dekens et 
al (1995). An important difference from the Charbonnier et al approach is that in our 
approach a sub-event is represented by the state of the tank (mass, volume, density, 
temperature) at the start and end of the specified time period, and not just by the single 
variable that the trend specifically pertains to. 
This paper describes improved reasoning processes proposed to help the inspector decide if 
further investigation is required. Based on considerable breadth and depth of knowledge, 
inspector reasoning processes are difficult to capture in a single paper. Effort is made in 
Section 2 to encapsulate some of the aims and pitfalls with clarity
2. Background
Worldwide many facilities process nuclear material in various stages of a civil nuclear fuel 
cycle, including fuel fabrication and reprocessing. These facilities are usually located in 
countries whose governments are signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (IAEA Information Circular 140). Agreements (IAEA Information 
Circulars 153 and 540) often then provide for the inspection of these facilities to confirm that 
their nuclear material is used as declared. Nuclear process plants are often large 
heterogeneous facilities that provide many potential opportunities for misuse, some more 
practicable than others. Although direct, indisputable observation of misuse is desirable, it is 
possible that misuse would be detected instead through the collection and analysis of 
evidence, particularly accountancy data. Any conclusions drawn from the analysis of 
evidence are then likely to invoke further investigation.
It is clear that any inference system that is poorly designed and implemented will create 
considerable work for all involved. Indeed, detection based on misinterpretations (so-called 
false alarms) is of major concern to inspectors, operators and governments (Friend, 2008). 
Importantly, when designed and implemented correctly, successful, robust handling of
evidence can contribute to misuse deterrence. Traditional nuclear safeguards agreements 
focus on the verification of the correctness of declared nuclear material inventories (Demuth 
et al., 2010) and on mass balance evaluation. Nuclear material accounts are formed and 
evaluated typically every month. 
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Accountancy can be augmented by the assessment of data collected more regularly from the 
plant, for instance every minute (Ehinger et. al., 2004). Such assessments can provide greater 
fidelity, because they suffer much less from the accumulation of measurement errors that can 
arise when accounting material movements over weeks of operation. However these 
assessments are sensitive to day-to-day operational activities and hence might generate false 
alarms. In many ways there are similarities between fault detection and diagnosis (Patton, 
Frank and Clark, 2000) and inspection, in that both seek to detect and diagnose anomalies. A 
key difference with inspection though, is the reduced access to knowledge.
It is important to appreciate that the inventory of plutonium within a plant cannot be 
measured directly in-line with existing measurement technology. Procedures that provide 
accurate estimates are both lengthy and expensive to perform and form the basis for relatively 
infrequent mass balance calculation and evaluation. In between such assessments the 
inspector looks for unexplainable deviations from acceptable practice, in those variables that 
can be measured. These variables are typically mass, volume, density and temperature. To do 
this the inspector has to have a good idea about what is acceptable practice. Of course, in 
normal operation most of these variables change with time, as tanks are filled and emptied 
and so on. The inspector has to look for deviations against this changing background. 
Fortunately any unexplainable deviations in these variables are either likely to have a 
consequential effect downstream, or have been caused by an incident upstream, or both. Parts 
of the plant will be opaque to the inspector creating difficulties when trying to make 
assessments of causes and effects. 
All current solution monitoring evaluation systems provide basic auto-correlation and cross 
correlation facilities that provide a capability to detect disagreements or issues. Current 
systems base their detection and correlation procedures on what is known as event marking. 
Event marking is a form of data compr ssion in which trend displays (mass or volume) are 
marked to highlight key features like the start and stop points of a filling operation. Burr et. 
al. (2011, 2012) describe the process of ‘event marking’ and learning to recognize events of 
interest, and to archive events such as sparging, recirculation, sampling so that we can learn 
typical behaviour.  In the Euratom family of computer tools data compression, auto 
correlation and cross-correlation functions are configured, implicitly, when a cycle (a form of 
signature) is constructed from icons [?????????????????????????????????]. The simplest 
cycle pertains to a batch-operated tank: here a cycle of icons would specify those significant 
ups and downs that would be deemed to be normal operation; the evaluation system would 
then step through the icons as each up and down was observed in the trend; start and end 
points would be marked by the observing icon; a disagreement would be raised if any change 
was unexpected. This is known as auto-correlation. Other tanks are either fed continuously, 
and emptied quickly, or fed quickly and emptied slowly. Here the allowable range of rate of 
continuous fill or empty is specified in an icon and a disagreement is raised if the rate 
deviates out of the specified range. Points when the quick empty or quick fill starts and ends 
are marked. Cross-correlation is then performed by comparing the mass/volume change 
between these marks with that change observed in the corresponding buffer tank. Again a 
disagreement is raised if they do not agree to within specified tolerances.
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Currently TaMES (Sirajov & Wang, 2008) helps IAEA inspectors evaluate measurements 
collected by data acquisition systems installed in batch operated tanks under safeguards. 
These systems provide assurance that plutonium nitrate carrying solutions travel through a 
batch-operated set of tanks as expected. The notion of acceptable practice should be 
transparent with such tank sets, because the bulk mass should remain constant during the 
period when a tank is filled. Typically, a TaMES will process in the order of 100,000 data 
records per tank per month to produce time histories pertaining to mass, volume, density, and 
temperature. Pertinent points are marked in one of these histories (usually mass) to generate 
compressed data. The change from one marked point to the next is known as a sub-event. 
Events are generated by applying sets of rules to the sequences of sub-events. Typical events 
include imports, exports, inter-tank transfers, recirculation and acid addition. The 
construction of the rule-base is specific to a particular facility and individual rules can 
encapsulate plant operation in detail (Howell et al., 2009). 
In the ideal world, all of this would be straightforward. In the real world, the quality of the 
data might be far from ideal. Difficulties can arise with the instrumentation. Examples of 
measurement anomalies include dip-tubes becoming blocked or the air supply to the dip-
tubes becoming disconnected and so on. The number of possible conclusions is increased, 
giving the inspector more options to consider. The inspector interface becomes an even more 
important part of the overall system.
Figure 1 shows a version of an inspector panel for a plutonium nitrate storage area TaMES 
application. An example of such a facility can be found in Suzuki et al, (2009). Typically the 
inspector might view about a month of data in one session. The inspector performs these 
evaluations in three stages by clicking on ‘Load Raw Data’, then ‘Pre-process’ and finally
‘Analyse’. At each stage results are viewed in windows that fly-out when various options are 
selected. For instance an editor is provided to manually adjust markings, because accurate 
data marking can be difficult in certain situations. Figure 2 gives an example of what might 
be seen when ‘Plot markings and events’ is selected. There are three distinct areas in this 
window: the two graphs, a table of start/stop times that pertain to events categorised as ‘Out 
to ST2’ and a table of values that relate to the small red square that has been selected by 
clicking on the yellow mark, which preceded it. The bottom graph shows a time segment of 
the upper graph with red, circular markings, instead of yellow squares, to highlight the event 
shown in blue in the ‘Out to ST2’ part of the window. This was achieved by clicking on that 
particular row.  The pull-down window, which currently displays ‘Out to ST2’, lists the event 
categories that might be found. Of particular interest are the two categories, ‘Unresolved’ and 
‘User Defined’. The list of ‘Unresolved’ events are likely to be of most interest to the 
inspector as these are the ones that could not be explained automatically. It is intended that 
the inspector would satisfy himself that each event had a reasonable explanation. Having 
done this, he would remove that event from the list by declaring it as a ‘User Defined’ event. 
To do this, he would click on the ‘User-define events’ button (Figure 1), which would lead to 
an interactive display where the event could be named, then transferred from the 
‘Unresolved’ list to the ‘User Defined’ list.
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    Figure 1  A TaMES Inspector Panel
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Figure 2 ‘Plot markings and events’ 
Of course, reprocessing plants contain a great deal more than sets of batch-operated tanks. As 
far as the plutonium path is concerned, a reprocessing plant can be viewed in three parts, once 
spent fuel has been chopped up, dissolved in nitric acid and clarified. The first part passes 
clarified solution along a set of batch operated tanks until it reaches a feed tank. The second 
part starts from this feed tank where solution is imported in batches, but exported
continuously to a separation process. The first stage of the separation process exports to a 
standard 3-tank-set, which exports to a polishing plant, which exports to a second standard 3-
tank-set, which exports to an evaporator that exports to a receipt tank. The third part starts 
from this receipt tank where solution is imported continuously, but exported as batches down 
a batch-operated tank set. Each standard 3-tank set consists of a continuous-import/batch-
export receipt tank, a batch-import/batch-export buffer tank and a batch-import /continuous-
export feed tank.
The inspector’s ability to decide what is acceptable practice now depends very much on the 
inspector’s knowledge of the plutonium flow through the plant. Acceptable practice is that 
which conserves plutonium mass. Unfortunately, and has been said before, plutonium flows 
can only be inferred, since they cannot be measured directly with today’s technologies and 
budgets. In addition, measurements can be anomalous, although there is usually more than 
one way to infer plutonium flows, because of analytical redundancy in the data. This might 
lead the inspector to a three pass evaluation of trend data, before making a commitment to 
carry out further investigations at the plant.
Pass 1: reason about TaMES graphs and unresolved sub-events in a semi-qualitative fashion, 
largely relying on experience-based template matching.
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Pass 2: assess whether plutonium flows are conserved, perhaps by eliminating certain 
suspected-to-be-anomalous measurement sources.
Pass 3: determine that amount of solution that must be removed to explain the plutonium 
flows observed.
Three examples are discussed here to elaborate on this procedure. To assist with this 
discussion, Figure 3 shows the key unexplained deviations in their mass trends: figures (a) & 
(b) pertain to a buffer tank in a standard 3-tank arrangement, whilst (c) relates to a receipt 
tank in the same arrangement
(a)
(b)  (c)
Figure 3 Mass versus time trends for three separate circled incidents
Example (a) A measurement anomaly in the buffer tank; perhaps this was caused by the 
introduction of air to inject solution into the tank. Pass 1:  the inspector would be familiar 
with this signature. Pass 2: the inspector might still wish to confirm that the solutions 
exported from the tank upstream, and imported downstream were appropriate. In other words 
he would ignore buffer measurements that were collected during that brief period and test 
whether flows now balanced.
Example (b) A removal of approximately 0.49 m3 of solution from the buffer tank. Pass 1: the 
inspector would likely think that the sudden step down looked odd, and consider a number of 
possibilities. It is possible that an instrument technician had knocked the calibration off; the 
desk operator had seen this and asked the technician to re-adjust, which had then been done 
after the tank had been emptied. A small amount of solution might have been exported either 
downstream, or to its recycle tank. There might have been an undeclared removal. Pass 2:
flows along 2 paths require confirmation; flow calculations would either be based on these 
buffer measurements, or would be based on flows based on neighbouring tanks. Pass 3: 
would be required if none of these alternatives correlated with the data. Flow calculations 
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would now be repeated, but with a quantity of solution removed at the time of the sudden step 
down. This scenario would now be correlated with the data.
Example (c): A removal of approximately 2.3 m3 from the receiving tank: from either the 
receiving tank directly, or from the pipe leading into it. Pass 1: the inspector might think that 
the deviation in rate of fill was abnormal, and consider a number of possibilities. It is possible 
that the throughput of the process upstream had been reduced, temporarily. A quantity might 
have been exported to the buffer tank. There might have been an undeclared removal. Pass 2: 
flows into the upstream process unit would be examined to establish if a temporary change 
had been made; flows to the buffer tank would be correlated with the deviation in fill rate. 
Pass 3: would be required if none of these alternatives correlated with the data. Flow 
calculations would now be repeated, but with a quantity of solution removed at the time of 
the deviation. This scenario would now be correlated with the data.
It can be seen that the procedures are founded on assessments of how materials propagate 
through a plant. Materials propagation calculation can be viewed as a form of simulation.  It 
can also be seen that the inspector would benefit from a computer tool that enables him to 
perform these assessments. The authors’ intention is that this would be in the form of an 
enhancement to current TaMES developments.
These three examples are about the measurement or removal of bulk material, and are 
therefore relatively easy to see in trends. There are many examples that are more about the 
individual components within flows, and are more opaque in trends. Similar procedures 
apply, but are more subtle. For ease of explanation what follows refers to reasoning about 
bulk materials. 
3. Overall Goals
The overall aim is to help the inspector decide whether any unresolved event presented by the 
evaluation system requires a major investigation. In each case the inspector has to decide 
between the 3 alternatives:
 Measurement anomaly
 Transfer related incident that is acceptable from a safeguards perspective
 Safeguards related incident
The last two suggestions involve the unexpected movement of material, while the first
doesn’t. In every case the inspector must be able to justify the choice made. Some cases 
might require some form of verification, even if they are thought to be of little safeguards 
significance.
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It is proposed to provide the inspector with three probabilities, evidenceP M   , 
evidenceP T   and evidenceP S   for each unresolved event, to help with this decision, 
where event M denotes a measurement anomaly, event T denotes an acceptable transfer and S
denotes a safeguards related incident. The probabilities are subjective and cannot be 
interpreted in any absolute sense; however, they do provide a basis for comparing the relative 
likelihoods of alternatives M, T, and S.   The primary system output is then a simple display 
such as that shown in Figure 4. A number of sliders, buttons and displays are also provided to 
enable the inspector to explore both the sensitivity of these three probabilities and how they 
were come by. All of the sliders are preset at values obtained from the calculations. Their 
functions will be discussed later.
Once the inspector has selected one or more sub-events that are likely to represent a single 
event, the system establishes probabilities that the TaMES outputs (T : graphs and un-
resolved sub-events) implicate either a safeguards related event or a non-safeguards related 
event i.e. the system would seek probabilities TP S    and TP S    . At this stage inspector 
confidence in reaching a definitive decision is likely to be low. This confidence could be 
improved if the inspector were to have a tool that can assess some form of archived database.
If such a tool existed, then the system could start its evalu tion with default a priori 
probabilities  P S and  P S , whose values would remain hidden from the inspector. The 
system would also have defaults for the probabilities that the TaMES outputs (T) were 
caused by either a safeguards related event TP S    or a non-safeguards related 
event TP S   . Sliders could be provided to enable the inspector to alter these suggested 
values.
Then  1T T
T
P S P S P S          and
1
T T
T
P S P S P S 
                                  (1)
where  T T TP S P S P S P S             
However such a tool to estimate the required likelihoods such as TP S    from an archived 
database does not exist currently. The approach proposed for now is to ask the inspector to 
consider the odds in favour of TP S    and against TP S    . The odds in a favour of a non-
safeguards related explanation would be displayed and a slider would be provided so that the 
odds could be changed, within sensible bounds. 
The inspector would now move on to the first of 2 windows, where the inspector would 
explore the possibility that these sub-events related to a measurement anomaly. This would 
be the first time that the inspector was presented with the 3 probabilities displayed in Figure 
4, which would be the main outcome of this exploration. The inspector would move on to the 
second window, if the safeguards related outcome were still thought to be possible. The 
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actual contents of these 2 windows will be discussed in Section 5. Section 4 first describes 
what has to be performed to generate their content.
Figure 4
4. Reasoning about Quantities 
Event Generation
A language has evolved in safeguards to describe what is seen in trends: process activities 
that an inspector or operator can relate to are described as events. Each event can be 
distinguished by a number of deviations in the trends. Each deviation is known as a sub-
event, so that an event is composed by one or more sub-events. Those deviations (sub-events) 
that cannot be attributed to known events are then deemed to be unresolved.  Sub-event 
extraction is the process of identifying these features in the data. In its simplest and most 
explicit form it can derive from ‘vertex marking’. The science, or more appropriately, the 
skill, of vertex marking is relatively general. The reference to ‘skill’ alludes to the 
observation that there are many choices that have to be made when specifying procedures for 
vertex marking. These choices are influenced by the form of the data themselves. Vertices are 
often masked by process disturbances, perhaps associated with transient effects that might be 
attributed to motion or to thermal stratification. Other effects might also be observed in the 
data, like the regular automatic agitation of the liquid (i.e. sparging). Marking the most 
appropriate points can often be a challenge (Burr et. al, 2011). Further details on this 
representation can be found in Howell & Scothern, 2000 and in Howell, Ehinger and Burr, 
2007. Further details on trend marking can be found in Miller and Howell (1999) and in 
Combastel (2004).
Once marked, a trend can be outlined by a sequence of markings. A single sub-event denotes 
the change from one mark to the next. If this trend is of bulk mass and the mass at mark i
is iM then the change in mass bi that occurred during the i
th sub-event SEi will be estimated 
as:
1iˆ i ib M M                                                  (2)
Page 13 of 27
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
13
Tildes  denote measurements (either direct or indirect), while hats  denote predictions. A 
mark relates to a particular data point, there is no data filtering, which is important from an 
accountancy perspective, because filtering introduces ambiguities.
If 0M is the mass measured at the start of the sequence
0
1
ˆ : 0
i
i j i
j
M M b M

                          (3)
Events are identified by applying lists of rules, Rk : Rk = [rk,1, rk,2, …], to the tables of sub-
events (Howell et al., 2009). A separate table of events,  ,1 ,2, ,i i it t tE e e  , is generated for 
each tank, ti  Tanks.  A separate sub-event table, 
it
SE SE  is associated with each tank so 
that the first row in 
it
SE , ,1itse , has 2 elements [p1, p2], the second row, , 2 ,itse  has 2 elements 
[p2, p3] and so on, where p1 and p2 are the first 2 marked points for that particular tank and so 
on.  Each marked point has a set of properties associated with it, like those shown in the 
bottom right-hand table of Figure 2.  A bulk mass change bˆ can be calculated for each sub-
event.
For a specified tank, ti, each rule is written so that it operates on the first, and where 
necessary subsequent elements, in
it
SE . When needed sub-events associated with other tanks 
will also be referenced. This might arise, for instance, when the rule focuses on an inter-tank 
transfer.  The application of any rule might lead to: a) the generation of an event, ,it ke ; b) the 
removal of associated sub-events, bo h locally, i.e. from 
it
SE , and more widely. Formally the 
lth rule in the kth list, rk,l,  might be described as:
           
  , ,1 , , 1 1, , , , ,i i i i ik l i t t t k t t kj j jr t SE E e e E e SE SE                              
The overall process is then as follows:
 ti  Tanks, 
Select the most appropriate rule-set, k:
 ,it jse  itSE ,
    , ,3 ,2 ,1 1, ,{} ,ik p k k k i t pr r r r t SE E SE
The construction of the rule-base is specific to a particular facility, with individual rules 
encapsulating plant operation in detail. Its construction can become fairly involved when data 
lack consistency. The ordering of the rules within each rule base Rk can matter, because the 
order in which sub-events are eliminated can affect the outcomes. This explains why Rk is 
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denoted by a list [ ] as opposed to a set { } in the above. Examples of rules can be found in 
Howell et al. (2009). Of particular importance to the discussion here, are those rules that 
identify a batch transfer between two tanks: these rules cross-correlate that shipped with that 
received, or more formally, they find a set of sub-events (an event) in both tanks that 
correlate both in magnitude and in time. To elaborate on this, suppose that an export event EX
has been found in one tank that is immediately upstream of another tank that has a 
corresponding import event EI. For simplicity suppose that both events are formed from 
single sub-events with associated mass changes ˆXb (X for export) and ˆIb (I for import). Then 
the rule would form and test the residual | ˆXb - ˆIb | < T for some alarm threshold T. Evidence 
T would then only contain the sub-events associated with EX and EI if this test failed.
Having applied all the rules, what remains in 
p
SE are then the ‘unresolved’ sub-events. 
These sub-events are likely to appear in separate temporal groups so that the inspector can 
easily focus on both the tank set of interest, and on the analysis window that defines the time 
period of interest. At this stage the most likely cause of any remaining unresolved sub-events 
is one of a measurement anomaly, either directly or indirectly where material is transferred 
into a recycle tank that is so rarely used that its instrumentation has not been maintained.
Material Propagation
Material propagation calculations help distinguish measurement anomalies from transfers, 
because any mass transport must obey the Laws of Conservation, which dictate that all the 
material that has entered a particular part of a plant must still be located somewhere, unless it 
has left the plant already. There are four parts to the calculations: flow estimation, mass 
prediction, residuals generation and testing. Flow estimation will be erroneous if a 
measurement anomaly is taken as a transfer instead. Residuals will be erroneous if material 
simply disappears. The time period over which the analysis is performed must be sufficiently 
long to enable the observation of material propagation effects. 
Alternative flow estimates are examined to isolate measurement anomalies. The simple 
example with an import and export above is considered again to explain this. To conserve 
mass either the transfer estimate can be based on mass change ˆXb giving contents predictions
1 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆtank j-1: ; tank j:i i X i i XM M b M M b                (4)
or on mass change ˆIb  giving contents predictions 
1 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆtank j-1: ; tank j:i i I i i IM M b M M b                 (5)
or the average ˆIb and ˆXb can be taken instead. Residuals as defined by
ˆ
i i ir M M                    (6)
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can be generated for all of these cases. Suppose that ˆ 0X Xb b  , but ˆIb  is non-zero, then 
residuals based on equation 4 will be zero if measurement noise is zero, while the sequence 
of residuals based on equation 5 will not be zero, from i onwards in the upstream tank and 
from (i+1) onwards in the downstream tank. These differences in residual histories provide 
additional evidence (C) with which to reason.
The approach adopted here is to reason about these alternative calculations (propagations) in 
parallel. Thus there are propagations forwards that are based on bXs and backwards that are 
based on bIs. If unresolved sub-events derive from mass trends, these sub-events must either
relate to changes in mass or to measurement anomalies. If the performance of a particular 
measurement source is under suspicion, then materials propagation can be based on exports 
from the tank upstream together with imports to the tank downstream:
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆtank j-1: ; tank j: ; tank j+1:i i X i i X I i i IM M b M M b b M M b                 (7)
This is akin to constraint suspension (Davis, 1984) if tank j instrumentation is ‘suspended’. In 
particular the following alternative propagations have been found to be useful for the 
standard 3-tank set described before: forwards, buffer dominates and buffer suspect. These 
alternatives are termed rationales. In forwards, each forcing function is formed from sub-
events associated with exports; in buffer dominates, where possible each forcing function is 
formed from sub-events associated with the buffer tank; in buffer suspect, where possible 
forcing function formation avoids sub-events associated with the buffer tank.
The consideration of material propagation across process stages would be slightly different, 
because unmetered flow rates mean that only key quantities such as the masses of uranium 
and plutonium are conserved. This extension is not described here. 
Time histories can be predicted on the basis of these material propagation calculations. These 
histories can then be marked and residuals can be generated by comparing these markings 
with those obtained from the plant data. There is no guarantee that the predicted histories will 
be marked in exactly the same way as the real data were marked, so care must be taken to 
ensure that the most appropriate markings are compared. 
Probability Determination
Mass balances are structurally correct. If all transfers, bi, into and out of the balance area are 
known, without measurement error then
1 : 0i i i iM M b M                                        (8)
If M0 is the true mass at the start of the analysis window:
0
1
: 0
i
i j i
j
M M b M

                                    (9)
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Equations (8) and (9) can be viewed as alternative forms of a structurally correct model that 
is driven by a forcing function defined by the sequence 1i i Nb   . An estimate for each bi can 
be obtained from the ith sub-event in the analysis window (equation 2).
Uncertainty in the mass trend therefore derives from the predicted transfers
1
ˆ
i
i N
b
 
   , whose 
values will depend on the rationale adopted. A sequence of errors [ γ1, γ2, γ3, ...] can therefore 
be defined for each rationale:
iˆ i ib b      (10)
so that
1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ: 0i i i iM M b M  
0
1
0
1 1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ: 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ: 0
i
i j i
j
i i
i j j i
j j
M M b M
M M b M

 
   
    

                               (11)
The initial condition 0Mˆ is estimated as 0 0Mˆ M  and in general mass measurements will 
have errors, :i i i iM M  
The ith residual, ri, is then
0
1 1
0
1
ˆ
i i i
i i
j j i i
j j
i
j i
j
r M M
M b M 
  
 


    
  
 



                             (12)
If there are no measurement anomalies, and errors are additive, then we can assume that
   2 20, and 0,i iN N      . In practice the true value of γi would be smaller than this on 
those occasions when the condition ˆ 0iM   has to be imposed.
A transformation T can be introduced to relate the vector of residuals (vector r) to the vector 
of error sources (vector e where e = [γ1, γ2 , γ3 …, 1, …]): 
, ,N M  r Te r e                                          (13)
The covariance matrix for r is then 'T T  where  is the error vector covariance matrix.
Every element of the residuals vector rr obtained for rationale r can be normalised thus:
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  12' rT T r                                                              (14)
The sum of the squared, normalised residuals is then
     1 1 12 2r r r r  
          
r T T T T r r T T r             (15)
Assuming r is approximately Gaussian distributed, this sum is approximately Chi-squared 
distributed with N degrees of freedom, so that the probability that this residuals vector is 
associated with an anomaly free model can be obtained from the associated cumulative 
probability distribution.
A simple, configuration specific, rule-base now compares the probabilities obtained for each 
of the rationales to decide which rationale produces the smallest normalised residuals and on 
that basis to assign probabilities:  C TP M    ,  C TP S     and  C TP T     where C
denotes the evidence based on the Laws of Conservation as described above. These values 
are preset on sliders so the inspector can explore other values.
The way that residuals are aggregated depends on both the focus and on the rationale 
selected. Normally a sequence of residuals would be generated for the focus. Each residual 
would be squared and summed to obtain a total squared error. However this would not be the 
case if the measurements for the focal tank were hypothesised as suspect. Residuals would 
then be generated for both receiving and feeding tanks: the total squared error would then be 
the combined values.
Probabilities TP S    and TP S     are then updated as follows:
 
    
C T
C T C T
P M
P M P T
 

   
  
      
                      (16) 
The probability of a measurement anomaly/acceptable transfer is:
T TP M P S                                                  (17)
 1T TP T P S                                            (18)
An additional hypothesis F is introduced to represent the possibility that the event occurred 
elsewhere:
       1T C T C T C T C CP S P T P M P F                                     (19)
where “Locality” C is set to 0.99, but can be altered by adjusting a slider.
Then
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     CC T T C C T T
C
P S P S P S P S
      
                                                             (20)
and so on where
     C C T T C T T C T TP S P S P T P T P M P M                                
Generating Additional Material Movements
The focus here is on the possibility that the unresolved sub-event is a direct consequence of 
an undeclared material movement and hence has safeguards relevance. That is a mass δ was 
moved, unexpectedly, during the period of time marked by the unresolved sub-events, and 
from that particular tank. Mass δ is inferred, the forcing function is adjusted to accommodate 
this additional flow from the tank, and material is propagated to generate residuals, which are 
then minimised by adjusting δ. The procedure above is now repeated for each rationale, 
resulting in the generation of the following conditional probabilities, where θR denotes the 
additional information obtained by removing material:
  R C TP S     ,   R C TP T      and   R C TP M     .
Defining “Locality” R here as 
       1R C T R C T R C T R C T RP S P T P M P F                                  
(21)
Then
     RR C T C T R R C T C T
R
P S P S P S P S
          
                                 (22)
where
       
   
R R C T C T R C T C T
R C T C T
P S P S P T P T
P M P M
          
    
                   
        
and so on. 
A brief comparison of the various pieces of evidence
There is one mass conservation model that can be evaluated on the basis of forcing functions.
θT is actually mass conservation based on the forwards rationale , although the residuals are 
not summed together
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θC compares various forcing functions that are derived from the measurements
θR is based on the forwards forcing function when successful, but with additional sub-events 
introduced to relate to the removal.
5. A Prototype Evaluation System
This section describes a prototype evaluation system developed specifically to investigate 
inspector interface issues. The system focuses on the standard 3-tank arrangement that is 
located normally between the solvent extraction and polishing cycles 1, or between polishing 
and concentration. To do this the system also has to take boundary activities into account. 
The system assumes that process stages, both upstream and downstream, would operate as 
‘black boxes’ (i.e. inventory histories would not be a available), so boundary activities have 
to be inferred from tanks located immediately upstream and downstream of these process 
stages. There would also be a recycle tank making 6 tanks in all. The system model used in 
the materials propagation studies is kept simple. Both the uranium and fission product content 
in this part of the plant would be low, so the mass content in each tank can be represented by 
three components (states): bulk, plutonium content and acid content. The minimisation 
process needed to determine optimum removals of material is performed by the Scientific 
Python optimisation routine fmin, which applies the Nelder-Mead (1965) simplex algorithm 
and does not require gradient evaluations.
The system takes its data from a detailed simulation of this part of a reprocessing plant. The 
system lacks tools to filter out process and measurement fluctuations, so comparisons that are 
made between plant and calculated histories will be somewhat peculiar to the 
implementation. A different interface would have to be developed before the computer 
package could be applied to data collected from an operational plant. 
Sliders are provided so that most system parameters would be transparent to the inspector. 
There are a few exceptions: estimation error variances, 2 and measurement error
variances 2 . Inspectors are well versed in the characterisation of random measurement error 
sources, so these are likely to remain unchanged also. A discussion of the estimation error 
variances is given below. The odds in favour of a non-safeguards related event TP S    as 
opposed to a safeguards related event TP S    was pre-set at a very pessimistic 400:1. 
Although a number of parameters are contained in the simple, configuration-specific rule-
base that assigns probabilities:  C TP M    ,  C TP S     and  C TP T    , the 
outcomes are set on sliders, which the inspector can adjust.
Figure 5 shows the measurement anomaly window produced when Example (a) data were
evaluated. The results are given in a small table with headings, Rationale, Residual and 
Probability. The Buffer_Suspect rationale is the only one with a non-zero probability (0.635), 
so this is selected by the buttons shown immediately below. The simple rule-base now presets 
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the first slider with this probability and divides what remains between the other 2 sliders (i.e. 
0.18 each). The 4th slider is now preset at the ratio of “(slider_1 / slider_1 + slider_3)” and 
locality is preset at 99%. A 91.6% measurement related conclusion is drawn. There is no need 
to move to the second window (i.e. to simulate a removal). One of the points of providing 
sliders is to demonstrate to inspectors the sensitivity to the variation of certain aspects on the 
safeguards related probability. Adjusting either the measurement, transfer or a priori split 
sliders now just shifts the emphasis from Measurement related to Transfer related without 
impacting on Safeguards Related. In other words the system is quite confident that the error 
has no safeguards relevance and so in this case is insensitive to certain aspects of the 
safeguards related probability. Reducing the odds in favour of a non-safeguards related 
event TP S   from 400:1 to 60:1 increases the safeguards related probability from 0.084% 
to just 1.921%. Reducing it further to 23:1 gives 6.66% which might be sufficiently large to 
lead the inspector to assess the possibility of a removal, where no sensible removal would be 
found. Because the prior odds are subjective, the intent is to provide the simple slider tool to 
encourage the inspector to experiment with a range of prior odds as just illustrated.
Figure 6 shows the removal window produced when Example (b) data were evaluated. A 
removal of 0.493 m3 of solution is required to compare the model with the data when the 
forwards rationale is selected. The correlation is high resulting in a probability of 99%, so 
this is selected by the buttons shown immediately below. The simple rule-base now presets 
the second slider with this probability and divides what remains between the other two sliders 
(i.e. 0.05 each). The table suggests an alternative, that of ‘Recycle_suspect’. This simply 
encourages the inspector to check that recycle tank instrumentation is in order. The 
safeguards related probability is significant (32.9%). A very high number at this stage could
escalate the investigation prematurely. Moving the measurement slider has no effect. Moving 
the transfer slider all the way to 1 shifts the emphasis away from safeguards related, reducing 
it to 2.46%. This might still be significant and require further investigation. Reducing the 
Locality slider merely scales all probabilities, again making the inspector aware that 
something might have happened elsewhere. Reducing the odds in favour of a non-safeguards 
related event TP S   from 400:1 to 38:1 increases the safeguards related probability from 
32.9% to 83.1%; a probability of 96.7% is obtained with odds of 23:1.
When Example(c) data were evaluated, a removal of 2.35 m3 of solution was required to 
correlate the model with the data when the forwards rationale was selected. This single piece 
of information would be sufficient to alert the inspector. The correlation however had a very 
low probability, although visually the revised model predicted history correlated with the 
trend very closely. This issue relates to the way batch transfers are estimated in continuously 
fed or emptied tanks. Safeguards related probabilities of 2.9% and 10.7% were obtained when 
the estimation error standard deviation was increased by factors of 4 and 5 respectively.
Examples (a) and (b) were re-evaluated to examine the effect of increasing the estimation 
error standard deviation by 4. Safeguards probabilities of 99% and 31.5% respectively were 
returned, suggesting that these examples were relatively insensitive to this parameter. In other 
words a common estimation variance would suffice for all examples. However it does raise 
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the question whether a flow rate estimator should be implemented to generate a flow rate 
trend, which the system could reason with. This would represent an enhancement to the 
approach described here, and hence is outside the scope of this paper. 
6. Conclusions
Over the past decade, experience has built up into the development of computer evaluation 
tools for inspectors. Transferring an approach from an outline to a field implementation is 
both time-consuming and expensive. Real (usually confidential) data have to be introduced 
into the development at an early stage. The end-user has to be involved also. This paper gives 
an initial approach, which is founded on such experiences. Some of the subtleties in the 
computer interface reflect this. The concept must be shown to have a realistic chance of 
success before funding can be committed towards field implementation. The approach
described here has a well-founded structure and very few hidden parameters, which the 
inspector can relate to. However, it is still at its first stage of development. A prototype has 
been developed for implementation on the standard three-tank configuration (Bevan et al., 
2011). This awaits inspector evaluation.
The proposed system represents a considerable extension to all current systems, which have 
limited reasoning capabilities, A brief comparison of current user interfaces can be found in 
Howell et al., 2010.  Event marking combined with sequential testing of resulting residuals 
(Burr et al. , 2011) is an alternative approach that has yet to be developed to any realistic 
extent. Such an approach does look across events, but has probably relative low detection 
probability for any specific scenario, because it's not tuned to any particular scenario. Any 
comparison with the proposed methodology would be difficult, because it would force the 
described approach (which is intended to facilitate subjective reasoning) into an 
objective/quantitative mode.
Material might be removed from certain parts of the plant that are relatively opaque to the 
inspector. In such situations it is likely that there would be secondary effects that would be 
more visible, especially if the inspector has a means of comparison with what is normal. 
Howell (2009) has explored this, and proposed that material propagation can represent a 
reference to normality again. This represents an extension to the approach discussed here.
Other extensions have been discussed in the text.
Quantitative reasoning here is based on simple structurally correct models that are driven by 
forcing functions, which can be estimated in a number of different ways. The paper suggests 
one application specific approach to the formulation of these different ways, to their 
presentation and to their integration into the evaluation process. As such the end user might 
find the underlying theory opaque. It might be worth considering alternative presentations 
that are more explicit in their approaches, whilst remaining attractive to the nuclear 
safeguards inspector. Safety inspectors might wish to consider whether a similar approach 
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might be of use when faced with incidents like Three Mile Island and Fukushima. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests the need to reason quantitatively.To a certain extent the approach is similar 
to what one might envision, for example, in recognizing unnatural disease outbreaks or in 
modern quality control applications. In monitoring for unnatural disease outbreaks (Burr et al. 
2007) one must use observed patient symptoms that are measured with error, account for the 
background incidence of possible diseases (the "prior" probability of each candidate disease), 
and somehow aggregate estimated probabilities of candidate diseases by patient over space 
and time. Burr et al (2007) allowed the user to vary the prior disease probability for the same 
reason our safeguards sliders are provided.  In modern quality control, described for example 
in (Hines et al., 2007), there is a need to monitor both for product quality drift and for 
instrument calibration drift, so the task of learning normal behaviour is challenging for 
reasons that are similar to the reasons it is challenging to learn normal behaviour in our 
described safeguards application. In both examples, the overall approach is likelihood based, 
relying on a probability model for residuals associated with events that is learned from 
training data that is assumed to not contain the event of concern. In our case, the event of 
concern is any safeguards related event. In monitoring for unnatural disease outbreaks, the 
event of concern is biological attack. In modern quality control setting, one event of concern 
is product quality drift, but instrument drift is a nuisance noise source.
Acknowledgements
The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative of the National Nuclear Security Administration 
part funded this work.
Page 23 of 27
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
23
Figure 5 Measurement anomaly window
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Figure 6 Removal window
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Highlights
 Nuclear safeguards inspector interfaces for reasoning about abnormal events.
 Semi-qualitative reasoning based on sub-events.
 Quantitative reasoning about simple models that are driven by forcing functions.
 Fusion through Bayesian updating.
 Application to a standard 3-tank arrangement in a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.
 Examples that show responses to a measurement anomaly and two different removals.
